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An unknown treasure for historians of early
medieval Europe: the debate of German legal
historians on the nature of medieval law*
In 2009, Martin Pilch published an impres-
sive book combining medieval history, legal
history and legal theory,1 which was the subject
of a 2010 workshop in Frankfurt on medieval
legal customs as a problem of legal theory and
legal history. It would be wrong to think that
Pilch’s book resulted in a conference because it
was completely new. Actually, it marked just one
step, though a major one, in a debate amongst
German legal historians which already started in
1968 with publications by Karl Kroeschell.2 Its
central question may be easy: ›What is law in the
(early) middle ages?‹, but answering it has been
a challenge ever since 1968. In fact, one may
conclude that a final answer is, in all likelihood,
elusive. Nevertheless, many interesting advances
have been made and Pilch has used them to
attack outdated concepts of law.
Unfortunately, most scholars outside Ger-
many, Austria and Switzerland remain ignorant
of this fundamental debate. This is due, first of
all, to a linguistic problem. Many scholars do
not read German, and the major players in this
debate have written in this language only. How-
ever, that does not explain everything. An addi-
tional hurdle is the nature of the debate. It may
concern history, but it is also a debate amongst
lawyers, and their language has its own pecu-
liarities. Legal German is even more arcane to
outsiders, because it is based on a very systematic
thinking. Thus, even for those who have a good
knowledge of German and of law, it is very hard
to completely grasp all the subtleties of a legal
debate in German. After all, in no other country
the training as a lawyer takes more years than in
Germany, so that one cannot expect a foreigner
easily to master German legal. Thus, both lan-
guage and the high level of German legal scholar-
ship act as a barrier against outsiders.
Nevertheless, a debate on the nature of
medieval law concerns a crucial element of early
medieval society and should have come to the
particular notice of any historian of the Middle
Ages, unless he wants to come to some very
flawed conclusions. For example, there is a body
of historical literature in English which claims
that law did not really exist in the era of customs
because a strong authority, a monopoly of legit-
imate violence and trained lawyers were absent.3
In the German debate arguments for and against
this view can be found, but unfortunately they
are largely unknown. This text, therefore, wants
to bring those readers who are less familiar with
German into contact with the ideas of the Ger-
man legal historians on the nature of early
medieval law. Needless to say, this will only be
a very short introduction, but it is the hope of
this author that it will also be an invitation to
take the effort, first, to read the contributions by
Pilch and others in this volume and, later, the rest
of the literature in German on this debate. The
ultimate dream is that one day a young English
or American Ph.D. student will have the courage
to pick up this subject, to add his voice to the
debate, and most of all, to bring it, in all its glory
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The following does not offer a summary of
the whole debate, neither since 1968, nor of the
2010 Frankfurt workshop only, but rather a
first glimpse of a wonderful terra incognita. It
would be impossible to completely explore this
subject here because the works of three great
legal historians, Karl Kroeschell, Gerhard Dil-
cher and Jürgen Weitzel are part of it4 and also
because, before the 2010 Frankfurt workshop,
conferences in 1990,5 20006 and 20047 have
discussed this topic at large. Therefore, the fol-
lowing account will focus mainly on Pilch’s
article in this volume and his presentation of
the debate so far. Pilch’s book will not be the
focus here, because it is hard to read (Pilch was
also trained as a theoretical physicist and uses
that also in his book), and neither will all of his
ideas be exposed here. One other author and,
like all the other scholars mentioned, participant
of the 2010 Frankfurt workshop also needs to be
mentioned explicitly, Bernd Kannowski. Being
younger, he was not from the start involved in
the debate, but he wrote an excellent description
of its state in 2002,8 which is very helpful to any
new-comer (for me understanding this debate
would have been impossible without it). There-
fore, it is significant that even Kannowski has to
admit that he has not understood all of Pilch’s
book.9 Given that, it would be even greater
hubris of this author to make such a claim.
The starting point is, once again, Karl Kroe-
schell. In 1973 the second volume of his legal
history of Germany was published.10 Kroeschell
had been thinking hard on the legal concepts to
be used and for customary law he departed from
the established terminology. The concept ›legal
customs‹ (Rechtsgewohnheiten) replaced ›cus-
tomary law‹ (Gewohnheitsrecht).11 The termi-
nology as such was not new, but his usage of it
was. Kroeschell most of all wanted to have a
›new‹ word to better express the difference with
customary law and the distance between our
concepts and the Middle Ages. Medieval law is
different because:
– it operated within another mental framework
in which one did not work with the formulation
and application of norms;
– it did not really differentiate law, religion,
usage and morals;
– because the state was lacking and because
writing was not, or at least not primarily, used
in law.
At least in Germany Kroeschell was moder-
ately successful in promoting his new terminol-
ogy. For example, at the 28th German legal
history conference in 1990 there was a session
about ›legal customs and customary law‹.
Part of the success of Kroeschell’s new ter-
minology was the lack of a precise definition.
Others could take it up because it was an empty
box, waiting to be filled. Kroeschell himself put
the emphasis on procedure. Law was essentially
the law of procedure, whereas substantial law
could only exist in individual cases. Critics may
say here that the empty box has, in effect, re-
mained (almost) empty. Jürgen Weitzel went
beyond Kroeschell’s approach in his book on
the popular assembly and the law.12 Law to him
is what the court finds. Thus, the judgements are
the concrete manifestations of unwritten legal
customs, because they express the consensus.
This means that material law exists, but only
through the action of the court. Only Gerhard
Dilcher does not chain substantial law to forms
and courts. Instead he links the legal customs to
orality.13 Medieval law is different because it is
non written and written law cannot be the stand-
ard for measuring it. Nevertheless it has binding
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It should be clear that, so far, the efforts to
come to a generally accepted definition of the
concept ›legal custom‹ has failed, so that Pilch’s
work also tries to construct one. For this he
builds upon a trias found in Ebel’s history of
legislation in Germany.14 Rather confusingly, he
uses the word ›law‹ both in a broad and in a strict
sense. Law in the broad sense has three basic
forms: law in the strict sense, law by order of an
authority and law by choice of those involved.
Law in the strict sense can be equated with the
legal customs. However, all law can be seen as
legal customs, because each of the three basic
forms needs memory to operate and to be pre-
served. However, in the two other basic forms
the memory concerns an original order or choice
and the law results from the latter. For legal
customs, however, there is no other foundation
than memory itself, i. e. the common conviction
of the existence of law. This also means that it is
possible for rules to move from one of the two
other forms to that of the legal customs, because
the original foundation in order or choice has
been forgotten. Three main groups of legal cus-
toms can be distinguished:
– procedure, in particular before the court, but
also outside it (legal rituals and symbolic forms)
– abstractions: legal principles, legal terms etc.
– the individual rights, competences and legal
relationships, which only exist in the form of
memory.
With all this Pilch has not given the final
answer to the question of what legal customs are,
but, at least, he makes some new openings.
Pilch also stresses that the legal theories of
positivism are not a good tool for grasping the
reality of early medieval law. Previous authors
have also said this, but they did not always go as
far as Pilch. Giving up the concept of law as a
system, they kept on working with the building
blocks for a legal system, the abstract legal
norms. (One may remark here that not all law-
yers have been so enamoured of legal systems as
their German colleagues, but the idea of law as a
system, or at least a body of legal norms, has
indeed been pervasive.) However, they cannot be
used as instruments for describing early medieval
law, because they belong to a model, which was
developed for a state-oriented written law. Early
medieval law did not have systematic legislation
and did not consist of legal rules. The latter does
not mean that early medieval law did not work
with rules at all, but only that these rules are not
its constitutive elements and that early medieval
law cannot be reduced to a closed structure of
rules.
The next step is to try to define early medi-
eval law in its context of orality. Critics of legal
positivism may offer some ideas here and, there-
fore Pilch turns to Dworkin’s concept of law as
interpretative praxis.15 Law is not a fixed body
of norms, but an interpretative praxis, in which a
community constantly justifies its own legal
decisions. This model of law may not have been
made with early medieval law in mind, but it is
better able to accommodate it than the positiv-
istic theories. To do so, one has to see legal
customs no longer as a special type of norms,
but as another and autonomous mode of the
legal. Whereas the ideal type ›written law‹ is law
in the mode of norm and validity, the ideal type
›legal customs‹ is law in the mode of order and
memory. As such law is only one aspect ordering
medieval life, so that Pilch pleads for the use of a
concept developed by Bernd Schneidmüller and
Stefan Weinfurter, ›order configurations‹.16
Kannowski doubts whether this concept itself
may be useful. Yet, the idea of coexisting and
competing order configurations can be helpful in
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individual rights, but also about the general
frameworks in which they were embedded.
The great challenge is to come to a concept
of law which can underlay both the modes of
written law and of legal customs. For that, Pilch
takes violence into account. Law is the exercise
of (legitimate) violence with the goal of reducing
(illegitimate) violence, so that law is linked to
peace. Leaving aside the many interesting forays
into legal theory this concept of law can lead to,
it is possible to see several medieval phenomena,
like the feud, as legal, without using categories
from written law. That the latter are considered
to be indispensable indicates how great their
triumph is. To us they have become the ›natural‹
structure of law. Whether historians of the Mid-
dle Ages will really care about such a general
concept of law may be doubted, but many of
them will appreciate Pilch’s efforts to develop a
concept which also takes the Middle Ages into
account.
The debate on the nature of early medieval
law did not stop with the publication of Pilch’s
book. As the papers of the Frankfurt workshop
published in this volume show, he did not give all
the answers and his answers can themselves be
questioned. Nevertheless, his main argument is
hard to dispute. Legal theory and legal history
can learn something from one another. The
problem is that up to now it has been legal
theory and legal history in German. This text
surely will have done more than one injustice to
the participants in the German debate by reduc-
ing and misrepresenting their views, but if it will
lead to more interventions by outsiders, it will
have met its objective.
Dirk Heirbaut
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